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In a recently published article, we tested the widely held belief, 
particularly among those in the pharmaceutical industry, that the 
backlog in medicine registration applications at the Medicines 
Control Council (MCC) was a barrier to access to affordable generic 
medicines.[1] In the study, we investigated the availability of generic 
products of eight tracer medicines (amlodipine, ciprofloxacin, 
fluoxetine, lamivudine, metformin, oxytocin, rifampicin and 
simvastatin) that are commonly used in the treatment of the most 
prevalent diseases in SA.[2] Availability was assessed based on the 
number of generic products for each tracer medicine that had been 
registered at the time of the study in 2012, as well as the number of 
generics that were being marketed. We found that for most of the 
tracer medicines, more generics had been registered than were being 
sold in the market. When data were aggregated, they showed that 
only 54% of all registered generic brands for the eight medicines were 
marketed, which suggests that the backlog was not a hindrance to 
access to these medicines. 
In 2003, the DoH implemented a fast-track registration policy, 
not only for new chemical entities (NCEs) considered essential for 
national health and which may not be on the Essential Medicines List 
(EML), but also for all medicines on the EML, the majority of which 
are generics.[3,4] We found that for the period between 2007 and 2012, 
more generic medicines were registered through expedited review 
(fast track) than NCEs.[1] Since no limit is placed on the number of 
generics of a particular medicine that can be fast-tracked, it is likely 
that several generic applications may be in the fast-track system 
when many generic products for such medicines have already been 
registered. It is, therefore, not surprising that the fast-track review 
process, which should lead to a registration decision timeline of 
not more than 9 months after first submission,[3] is now also taking 
considerably longer. A backlog is therefore likely to be present, even 
in the expedited registration pathway. This, coupled with current 
shortcomings, such as insufficient skilled manpower and poor 
infrastructure at the MCC,[5] could prevent innovative as well as 
cost-effective and new fixed-dose combination (FDC) therapies from 
reaching patients timeously. 
According to the minutes of the Industry Task Group meeting 
held in March 2015,[6] the MCC has been allocating applications for 
review received from January until March 2012. This implies that 
the applications that make up the backlog are all those received up 
to December 2011 and which have not yet been reviewed. These 
applications will therefore only be evaluated once the MCC has 
acquired substantial additional capacity to start reviewing backlog 
applications. 
A class of important and potentially cost-effective medicines that 
may be part of the backlog is biosimilar medicines. These are products 
that are similar, i.e. not identical, to innovator biopharmaceuticals of 
erythropoietin, filgrastim, growth hormone, infliximab, etc. that 
are produced by modern biotechnological methods and are already 
off patent.[7] While many countries in the European Union, as well 
as Canada, Australia, Korea and even the USA, have registered 
such products, SA has yet to register its first biosimilar. Biosimilars 
are significantly cheaper than their innovator counterparts[8] and, 
consequently, more patients would have access to these medicines 
once they are registered. In Europe, biosimilars of somatropin, 
erythropoietin and filgrastim have been available since before 2010. [9] 
Considerable experience has therefore already been gained with 
the use of these products, so that doubts about their safety and 
efficacy should no longer exist. The MCC should, therefore, alter its 
strategy for the allocation of applications for evaluation from using 
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a specific date of submission such as January 2012 (as it currently 
does) to selecting product classes or types for which there is a public 
need, irrespective of when the applications of such products were 
submitted. 
The lack of restrictions on the use of the fast-track review system, 
such as placing a limit on the number of generics of a specific 
medicine that can be reviewed and registered via this process, can 
result in delays in the registration and availability of medicines of 
Table 1. Date of registration, single exit price per dosage unit and market share of selected tracer medicines as at December 2012 
(names of registration holders for each product are included)
Active pharmaceutical 
ingredient 
(strength/dosage unit) Brand name
Date of registration
(YYYY/MM/DD) Holder of registration certificate
Price/unit
(ZAR)
Market share by 
volume (%)
Alendronate (70 mg/tablet) Osteobon 2005/07/29 Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd 45.60 44.4
Fosamax* 2002/03/26 MSD (Pty) Ltd 93.84 6.3
Osteonate 2010/11/26 Pharma Dynamics (Pty) Ltd 38.29 1.7
Fosagen 2006/02/17 Mylan (Pty) Ltd 52.54 0.9
Sandoz 
Alendronate
2006/12/01 Sandoz SA (Pty) Ltd 56.48 0.3
Amlodipine (10 mg/
tablet)
Amloc 2004/09/17 Pharma Dynamics (Pty) Ltd 3.61 37.8
Ciplavasc 2005/02/11 Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd 3.50 19.3
Lomanor 2005/09/23 Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 3.08 10.0
Norvasc* 1991/11/26 Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 6.71 4.6
Amlate 2006/08/11 Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 3.46 3.1
Ciprofloxacin (250 mg/
tablet)
Cifloc 2001/10/08 Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 1.31 21.6
Ciploxx 2003/01/24 Cipla Life Sciences (Pty) Ltd 1.25 17.3
Ciprobay* 1990/06/12 Bayer (Pty) Ltd 10.09 10.6
Austell 
Ciprofloxacin
2004/07/02 Austell Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 1.07 10.2
Ciprol 2004/07/23 Arrow Pharma South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1.19 6.4
Ciprogen 2003/09/05 Xixia Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd 1.39 5.8
Bio-Ciprofloxacin 2005/10/09 Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 0.97 4.5
Orpic 2002/09/20 Pharmacare Limited 1.26 2.9
Fluoxetine (20 mg/
capsule)
Nuzak 1998/05/25 Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd 1.22 45.7
Lorien 1996/03/27 Pharmacare Limited 1.18 24.0
Lilly-Fluoxetine 1995/10/25 Eli Lilly (SA) (Pty) Ltd 3.88 11.7
Rezak 2003/03/07 Ranbaxy (SA) (Pty) Ltd 0.74 4.5
Ranflocs 2003/04/25 Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 0.70 4.3
A-Lennon 
Fluoxetine
2001/09/21 Zydus Healthcare SA (Pty) Ltd 0.76 2.3
Zydus-Fluoxetine 2005/06/03 Pharmacare Limited 0.74 2.2
Prohexal 2000/12/13 Sandoz SA (Pty) Ltd 1.23 1.9
Prozac* 1986/12/31 Eli Lilly (SA) (Pty) Ltd 14.24 1.2
Actor Fluoxetine 2003/03/07 Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd 1.14 1.0
Metformin (500 mg/
tablet)
Glucophage* 1975/04/25 Merck (Pty) Ltd 0.49 49.1
Mylan Metformin 2000/12/13 Sandoz SA (Pty) Ltd 0.34 14.4
Sandoz Metformin 1984/03/26 Mylan (Pty) Ltd 0.35 11.5
Arrow Metformin 2005/09/23 Arrow Pharma South Africa (Pty) Ltd 0.36 4.4
Metforal 2002/09/20 Adcock Ingram Limited 0.35 3.4
Metored 2008/08/15 Pharmaplan (Pty) Ltd 0.34 3.1
Accord Metformin 2009/12/04 Accord Healthcare (Pty) Ltd 0.32 2.6
Gluconorm 2007/10/05 Be-Tabs Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd 0.34 2.3
Austell Metformin 2005/09/23 Austell Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 0.36 1.8
Continued ...
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public health importance. In our previous study, we found that 
changes in the treatment guidelines for tuberculosis (TB) may 
have made some FDC products containing rifampicin obsolete, 
causing them not to be marketed. New FDC formulations, and 
even new drugs for the prevention and treatment of multidrug-
resistant TB, even if fast-tracked, could take significantly longer 
than the specified 9 months expedited review and registration 
decision timeline. An example is an application for the registration 
of a generic version of linezolid that was submitted for fast-track 
review in May 2013 for the treatment of drug-resistant TB (DR-
TB). When a final decision on the product was still outstanding 
more than 16 months after its submission, activists handed over a 
letter addressed to the Registrar of Medicines, signed by clinicians, 
civil society organisations and patients with DR-TB, demanding its 
immediate registration.[10] The product was eventually registered 
in November 2014 and a second one in March 2015. At least six 
other generic linezolid tablet formulations (600 mg/tablet), all 
submitted as fast-track applications, are currently under review. 
This raises an important issue that needs to be considered if 
the fast-track review process is to be amended to improve its 
effectiveness: what should be the number of generics of a specific 
medicine that are allowed to be fast-tracked, to ensure not 
only timeous availability but also affordability through robust 
competition? Should the additional six applications also have been 
allowed in the fast-track system, which, with the current limited 
number of evaluators, will take preference over other fast-track 
applications for medicines for which there may potentially be no 
alternatives, or if alternatives exist, may not be as effective as the 
new medicine? 
Table 1 gives the single exit price per dosage unit (i.e. tablet or 
capsule) for several brands of each of six tracer medicines, their 
percentage market share by volume and their date of registration. 
Whereas the price difference between the generic products and 
their corresponding innovator is substantial in almost all cases, the 
variation in price among generics of a specific medicine is often not 
as large. Exceptions include where the patent holder of the innovator 
markets a generic version of its own product (a clone or autogeneric) 
as is the case with the fluoxetine generic Lilly-Fluoxetine which, 
although priced at only 27% of the cost of the innovator product, 
Prozac, was three times more expensive than the market leader 
(Nuzak). 
Another observation is that the market leader for a specific medicine 
is not necessarily the cheapest brand. In the case of the alendronate 
generics, for example, the cheapest product was Osteonate, which 
cost 16% less than the market leader, Osteobon. Yet, it only had a 
market share of 1.5%, whereas Osteobon had a market share of 44.6%. 
The higher market share was most likely due to earlier entry, since 
Osteobon was registered before Osteonate. In fact, for most of the 
other medicines in the sample, the market leader or its follower was 
registered first. An interesting observation was that one innovator 
product retained its dominant market position after generics entered. 
The metformin originator product, Glucophage, was still the market 
leader (at 49.1% market share) even though it was priced 35% higher 
than the cheapest generic (Accord Metformin, with a market share of 
2.6%) and 31% higher than the generic with the next highest market 
share (Mylan Metformin, with a market share of 14.4%). This price 
difference is similar to that found between the highest and lowest 
priced generics of some of the other tracer medicines. For example, 
for ciprofloxacin and alendronate, the difference in price between the 
most and least expensive generics was 40% and 48%, respectively. 
The price difference between the innovator and generic market leader 
for the other medicines ranged from 86% for amlodipine to 1067% 
for fluoxetine. Glucophage was therefore priced at the same level as 
generics, which ensured its dominant market position. 
Competition theory predicts that as more competitors enter a 
market, prices of products will fall. Hence, registering a large number 
of generics should lower the cost of medicines, increasing their 
accessibility. Our data show, however, that increasing availability 
through registration of more generics does not necessarily lead to 
greater access, as measured by percentage market share, even if these 
newly registered generics are priced lower than those already in the 
market. Regression analysis further confirmed the weak relationship 
(R2<0.05) between price and market share (data not shown). This 
suggests that at the prevailing price level of generics, other factors 
are more important determinants of market share. One such factor is 
market entry, since among our sample of six medicines, the brands 
with the highest market share were those that had been among the 
first to obtain registration. 
The data above, although based on a small sample of medicines, 
suggest that the contention of promoting competition by registering 
several generic brands of a medicine to ensure low prices and, hence, 
affordability to the patient, may not be valid. Affordability appears 
Table 1. (continued) Date of registration, single exit price per dosage unit and market share of selected tracer medicines as at 
December 2012 (names of registration holders for each product are included)
Active pharmaceutical 
ingredient 
(strength/dosage unit) Brand name
Date of registration
(YYYY/MM/DD) Holder of registration certificate
Price/unit
(ZAR)
Market share by 
volume (%)
Simvastatin
(20 mg/tablet)
Adco-Simvastatin 2002/09/20 Adcock Ingram Limited 1.02 58.3
Simvacor 2002/11/15 MC Pharma (Pty) Ltd 1.02 7.0
Cipla-Simvastatin 2006/10/06 Cipla Life Sciences (Pty) Ltd 0.97 6.9
Simvotin 2004/05/28 Ranbaxy (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1.10 5.8
Aspen Simvastatin 2005/07/29 Pharmacare Limited 1.10 5.4
Michol 2007/10/05 Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd 1.54 4.4
Zocor* 1990/04/02 MSD (Pty) Ltd 2.45 3.1
Arrow Simvastatin 2006/04/07 Arrow Pharma South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1.07 2.2
Choleste 2007/10/05 Be-Tabs Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd 1.07 1.4
Biovac Simvastatin 2006/12/01 Arrow Pharma South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1.07 0.9
* Innovator product.
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to be a function more of the price difference between the innovator 
and generics as a group, which can be substantial (>80%), as this has 
been shown to erode the market share of the innovator. Differences in 
prices among generic brands do not correlate with market share. What 
is far more important is market entry. Therefore, in the allocation 
of fast-track status to generic applications for a medicine that has 
gone off patent, the promotion of competition should not be a prime 
consideration, particularly in view of the capacity constraints at the 
MCC, i.e. the limited number of evaluators currently available. The fast-
track system should at all times be responsive and, consequently, must 
be reserved for new medicines, a novel formulation or combination of 
existing medicines based on new treatment guidelines, the first generic 
of an off-patent medicine, or for unique biologicals such as vaccines 
and biotechnology products, including biosimilars.
Finally, medicines with small local markets for which there are 
few registered products and suppliers are vulnerable to stock-outs 
when suppliers decide to discontinue their products. Oxytocin is 
one such product, with only three registered brands, and which had 
a market value of ZAR24.9 million in 2012. This is considered small 
relative to that of other products such as amoxicillin (ZAR441.4 
million), tenofovir (ZAR467.5 million), ibuprofen (ZAR498.4 
million) and paracetamol (ZAR1.697 billion). The product is 
only used in the hospital setting and requires cold-chain storage. 
These factors probably discourage local companies from including 
oxytocin formulations in their product portfolio. A more recent 
case involves intravenous rifampicin, which was under threat 
of being discontinued by the only supplier for this product. [11,12] 
It is important, therefore, to ensure that the fast-track system 
is immediately accessible when applications for such market-
vulnerable products are received by the MCC.
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